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Every Consumer Knows How to Run a
Business: The Dangerous Assumptions Made
When a Prior Possession Conviction is
Admitted as Evidence in a Case Involving
Commercial Drug Activity
ASHLEY HINKLE*
This Comment provides a discussion on Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), which for the past few decades has allowed federal prosecutors to
use instances of prior possession to fulfill elements of a different crime involving commercial drug activity. This evidence has been allowed in a variety of circumstances among the federal circuits, regardless of proximity in
time, relatedness, or similarity between the previous instance of possession
and the new commercial drug charge at hand. This Comment contains an
in-depth analysis of the evidentiary rule, procedural requirements, case
law, and the present circuit split on this issue. A recent decision by the
Third Circuit has shed light on this problem and has provided a framework
that suggests stricter guidelines should be used when instances of prior
possession are presented as evidence to fulfill elements of a commercial
drug crime. Lastly, this Comment presents an argument that emphasizes the
need for a uniform approach by either requiring a greater standard of relevancy or by excluding evidence of prior possession in cases concerning
commercial drug activity when the events are substantially unrelated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 1997, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arranged a purchase for crack cocaine as part of an ongoing investigation at
an apartment complex and targeted suspect Michael Liles.1 Elmer Haywood, a friend of Liles, was standing outside of the apartment complex
when the FBI informant first approached the building.2 The informant was
aware that Haywood and Liles were friends and asked Haywood to set up a
sale for one ounce of crack cocaine from Liles.3 Haywood told the informant to return in forty minutes.4 The FBI equipped the informant with a monitoring wire and a recording device.5 The informant then met Haywood
outside of the building and had a brief conversation, which Liles joined
shortly thereafter.6 The informant continued to discuss the sale with both
Haywood and Liles, and either Haywood or Liles went to the basement of
the apartment complex to retrieve the crack cocaine, which the informant
purchased.7 The sale did not result in an immediate arrest of Haywood because his role was unclear.8
Four months later, authorities arrested Haywood for possessing 1.3
grams of crack cocaine found pursuant to a search during a lawful traffic
stop.9 Charges brought against Haywood in state court were for possession
of crack cocaine, but the prosecutor later dismissed the charge.10 Nearly a
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 718 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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year after the crack cocaine sale to the FBI informant involving Liles,
Haywood was indicted by a grand jury on one count of possession of crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute.11 Haywood pled not guilty and the
government offered evidence of his dismissed offense to prove his intent, as
allowed under Rule 404(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.12 The prosecution presented testimony by the arresting officer for the dismissed offense regarding his findings and the physical quality and quantity of the
crack cocaine.13 The jury instruction stated to only consider the arresting
officer’s testimony with regard to the issue of intent in the present case.14
The jury found Haywood guilty and the judge sentenced him to a 115month prison term with an additional five years of supervised release.15
There are countless issues that arise when unrelated instances of possession are used for a Rule 404(b)(2) purpose and satisfy intent in a new
instance of possession with intent to distribute. For example, in United
States v. Haywood, the instance of possession occurred after the new
charged drug offense.16 Should an act that occurred after the charged offense fulfill intent for an act that occurred four months prior?17 In addition,
the use of a prior possession alone raises its own issues when used to satisfy
a new and separate instance of possession with intent to sell.18 A significant
dispute exists as to whether a prior instance of possession is indicative or
even relevant in a future instance of possession with intent to distribute
because they are entirely different acts: mere possession is indicative of
personal drug use and possession with intent to distribute relates to manufacturing, selling, or importing narcotics (hereinafter referred to as “commercial drug activity”).19 Therefore, how can previous possession or a possession conviction ever outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice in a new
charge of possession with intent to distribute?20 What exactly does a prior
conviction reveal in this context?21
This Comment defends the thesis that prior possession acts or possession convictions should not fulfill elements of commercial drug crimes under Rule 404(b)(2). As a result, courts should strictly criticize the use of
prior acts or convictions and only use this evidence in straightforward cir11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 718 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 719.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 718 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id.
See id.
United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 2002).

404

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

cumstances.22 Part II of this Comment involves a discussion of the background of the evidentiary rule, procedural requirements, and the most prominent United States Supreme Court case first addressing this rule. Part III
provides the prominent case law, includes analysis of the rule and all of its
steps, and offers clarification as to why this conclusion is logical. Part IV
contains an exploration of the circuit split, the differences between reasoning when presented with this issue, and how a number of courts have recently approached this issue correctly. Lastly, Part V presents arguments for
the need of a uniform approach by either requiring a greater relevancy
standard under Rule 401 or excluding evidence of prior possession in cases
concerning commercial drug activity.

II. BACKGROUND
Studies by the London School of Economics and the Chicago Jury
Project indicate evidence of a defendant’s prior act or conviction increases
the likelihood the jury will find a defendant guilty.23 These studies beg the
question: why admit this evidence and what are the limits of Rule
404(b)(2)?24 As long as prior act and conviction evidence is more helpful
than prejudicial, it can have legitimate purposes that may disadvantage the
defendant.25 It becomes problematic when these legitimate purposes extend
to an uncertain area, as supported by a circuit split.26
Before the formulation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a common
law inclusionary approach treated prior act evidence as presumptively admissible as long as the evidence was not relevant only to show the defendant was more likely to commit the crime.27 Beginning in the nineteenth century, the rule began to take a different form and became exclusionary.28
With this exclusionary approach, there is a presumption that evidence is
inadmissible unless it is relevant for a specific purpose.29 This new trend
occurred because the American courts mistakenly applied what they
22.
See United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1992). There are
times when the use of a prior act or conviction is logical. For example, if the defendant
claims that he has never seen the drug he has been charged with possessing, a prior possession conviction for that drug is relevant and outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.
23.
Jane C. Hofmeyer, Note, A Relaxed Standard of Proof for Rule 404(b) Evidence: United States v. Huddleston, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 79, 83-84 (1989) (citing E.J.
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:02, at 4 (1984)).
24.
See id.
25.
See United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1992).
26.
See Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L.
REV. 1547, 1558-60 (1998).
27.
See id.
28.
See id.
29.
See id.
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thought was the common law English rule.30 Due to this error, the Federal
Rules of Evidence created a uniform inclusionary approach in Rule
404(b).31 Even though the rule regarding prior act evidence has taken many
different forms, these changes did not influence the results or actual application of the rule, demonstrating courts are not exactly sure what to do with
prior act evidence.32 Since the creation of Rule 404(b), it is the most challenged evidentiary rule reviewed on appeal, further demonstrating the perplexity of the rule and inconsistent application.33
Rule 404 provides guidance to the courts when there is a request to use
character, prior act evidence, or convictions as evidence.34 Rule 404 has
two parts: (a) character evidence35 and (b) crimes, wrongs, or other acts.36
The overall purpose of Rule 404 and its subparts is to protect the defendant
against unfair prejudice, as the jury might give prior act or character evidence too much weight.37 If this evidence receives too much weight out of
context, the jury concludes the defendant is generally a bad person and deserves punishment—not because he is guilty of the crime at issue.38
Rule 404(a) concerns using general character evidence and states,
“[e]vidence of a person's character or character trait is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait.”39 Rule 404(a) also discusses exceptions to this general
rule in criminal cases, regarding the defendant and victim’s pertinent trait40
or a witness’s character, which exceeds beyond the scope of this Comment.41
Prior acts become evidence under Rule 404(b)(1) which states,
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.”42 Rule 404(b)(2) allows prior act
evidence and provides a non-inclusive list of purposes.43 Rule 404(b)(2)
30.
See id.
31.
See Melilli, supra note 26, at 1560; Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 992 (1938).
32.
See Melilli, supra note 26.
33.
See Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble
with Rule 404(b), 78 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005).
34.
See FED. R. EVID. 404 (West 2015).
35.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (West 2015).
36.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (West 2015).
37.
See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 4:21 (4th ed. 2013).
38.
Id.
39.
FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (West 2015).
40.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (West 2015).
41.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (West 2015).
42.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (West 2015).
43.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (West 2015).
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states, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”44
There are three different procedural steps to consider with Rule
404(b): pretrial motion, burden of proof, and the limiting instruction.45 The
pretrial motion is not required, but is strongly encouraged and is typically
the judge’s preference.46 The notice requirement encourages pretrial motions and provides an opportunity for the defendant to make a motion in
limine to exclude the damaging evidence.47 The defendant is usually the
party that files a pretrial motion, but either party can file a pretrial motion to
resolve these issues.48
Prosecutors bear the burden to show the other act evidence is relevant
and admissible against any objections of unfair prejudice.49 The prosecutor
meets this burden by showing the evidence meets a proper purpose under
Rule 404(b)(2) and the evidence is relevant to that purpose.50 With prior act
evidence, the prosecutor must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the prior act occurred, the defendant was the actor, and the prior act is relevant under Rule 404(b)(2).51 However, under Rule 104(b), it is the jury’s
role to decide if the prior act occurred and the defendant was, in fact, the
actor.52 This procedure is unnecessary when the prosecution is offering a
prior conviction.53 Prior convictions automatically meet their burden of
proof when presented as evidence, as it would meet any standard such as
preponderance of the evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.54
If the judge decides to allow the other act evidence or conviction over
the defendant’s objection, then the defendant can request a limiting jury
instruction.55 According to Rule 105, “[i]f the court admits evidence that is
admissible against a party or for a purpose--but not against another party or
for another purpose--the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”56 The purpose of the
limiting instruction is to ensure that the jury only uses the evidence for a

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 4:29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 4:29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 1:41.
FED. R. EVID. 105 (West 2015).
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particular purpose and not to decide other issues in the case.57 Prior act evidence has a serious threat of unfair prejudice and is a clear example of why
the limiting instruction exists.58 Concerning Rule 404(b), the jury should
decide the defendant had the knowledge to commit the alleged crime because his past conviction was for a crime completed in the same unique
manner;59 they should not conclude the defendant committed the crime
once, and therefore most likely repeated the offense.60 This example
demonstrates the significant and imperative relationship between Rule
404(b) and Rule 105.61
In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the use of
prior act evidence and its admissibility during trial.62 In April of 1985, the
Overnight Express yard located in South Holland, Illinois had approximately thirty-two thousand blank videocassette tapes stolen.63 The defendant,
Guy Huddleston, contacted the manager of a rent-to-own business for her
assistance in selling the tapes in bulk.64 Through their communications,
Huddleston assured the manager of the legitimacy of the tapes, and she
arranged the sale of five thousand tapes to a third party.65 At trial, there was
no dispute whether the tapes were stolen, but whether Huddleston knew
they were stolen.66
The prosecution requested to admit evidence of similar acts under
Rule 404(b)(2) to prove Huddleston’s knowledge.67 The first similar act the
prosecution offered was in the form of testimony by a record storeowner.68
The record storeowner testified that a few months before the incident at
issue, Huddleston offered to sell new black and white televisions for twenty-eight dollars each and indicated he could obtain thousands more if requested.69 The other similar act the prosecution offered was after the alleged tape theft, where testimony was provided by an undercover FBI agent
who was acting as a buyer for an appliance store.70 The FBI agent agreed to
57.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 1:41.
58.
See id.
59.
See id. §§ 1:41, 4:29.
60.
See id.
61.
See id. This example demonstrates how the limiting instruction has a valid purpose to determine the defendant’s knowledge, but has the potential to be detrimental if the
jury values the evidence more than its worth and makes a conclusion on the defendant’s
general character.
62.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
63.
Id. at 682.
64.
Id. at 682-83.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 683 (1988).
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
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pay eight thousand dollars for twenty-eight refrigerators, two ranges, and
forty-four icemakers from Huddleston.71 Huddleston was arrested and it
was determined the appliances were part of a stolen shipment valued at
twenty thousand dollars.72
The prosecution claimed that Huddleston was not on trial for his similar acts; however, this prior act evidence established Huddleston’s
knowledge that they were stolen tapes.73 In deciding the case, the Court
developed a test for evidence offered under Rule 404(b)(2), which states the
evidence must: (1) be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), (2)
be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced by Rule 104(b), (3) have probative
value that is not substantially outweighed by the potential of unfair prejudice, and (4) upon request, be provided in the form of a limiting jury instruction.74 These guidelines were created by the Court to guide courts in
the decision to exclude or admit evidence under Rule 404(b).75

III. THE HUDDLESTON TEST DISSECTED
Since the Court developed the test in Huddleston v. United States,
courts have inconsistently applied the common law rule due to varying circumstances.76 Even though the test provides a roadmap for which rules to
address, the amount of judicial discretion within the rules contribute to an
inconsistent application.77 The following analysis is narrowed to case law
involving drug crimes with emphasis on the issue of whether a prior possession conviction is in any way relevant or more probative than prejudicial in
a new and separate charge for possession with intent to sell.
A.

STEP ONE: PURPOSE ALLOWED UNDER RULE 404(B)(2)

Rule 404(b)(2) provides a non-inclusive list of purposes for prior act
evidence.78 Based on the purposes listed, it appears the list includes the only
practicable purposes for prior act evidence involving drug crimes.79 In addition, prosecutors can provide a number of purposes as to why a court should
71.
Id.
72.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 681 (1988).
73.
Id. at 684.
74.
Id. at 691.
75.
See id.
76.
See id.
77.
See generally United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 2013) (addressing the circuit split on the issue of whether prior possession convictions can support a new
charge of possession with intent to sell and how different outcomes have occurred due to the
amount of judicial discretion concerning prior act evidence).
78.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (West 2015).
79.
See id.
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enter a prior act into evidence;80 they are not limited to choosing one purpose.81 The most common purposes that are offered to use prior drug convictions under Rule 404(b)(2) is to show knowledge, intent, and/or absence
of mistake or accident.

1.

Knowledge

When a defendant offers testimony, in which he states that he has never seen marijuana before, a prosecutor can offer a seventeen-year-old prior
conviction for possession of marijuana into evidence.82 The evidence in this
instance proved the defendant’s knowledge of marijuana and impeached
credibility of the defendant’s testimony.83 The prosecutor involved in the
possession conviction already established knowledge and met his burden of
proof with the conviction itself; therefore, it is reasonable to admit this evidence for the purpose of knowledge.84 This prior conviction was allowed to
refute the defendant’s claim that he had never seen marijuana before.85 It is
likely that the prior conviction would not have provided a proper purpose
allowed under Rule 404(b)(2) if the defendant had not raised the issue of
knowledge.86 The use of knowledge in this instance appears to be straightforward, but consider whether a prior conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine can prove knowledge in a separate charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.87
A court held that a jury could infer from a prior conviction of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine that the defendant had sufficient
familiarity with the production of methamphetamine in order to possess
adequate knowledge to know how to distribute it.88 The defendant in this
case argued that the acts involved in these charges do not have a “logical
nexus” to support that he gained knowledge from manufacturing methamphetamine to know how to distribute it.89 Against the defendant’s objections, the court allowed this evidence and stated that prior act evidence does
not have to be similar to the charged act; rather, the prior act only needs to
make knowledge more probable than without the prior act evidence.90
80.
See Davis, 726 F.3d at 440 (the prosecution offered a prior possession conviction to show “knowledge or intent”).
81.
See id.
82.
See United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1032-35 (5th Cir. 1992).
83.
Id.
84.
See id.
85.
Id.
86.
See id.
87.
See United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 1001 (9th Cir. 1998).
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
See id.
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Courts have been able to infer enough from prior manufacturing convictions to prove knowledge in a separate charge for distribution.91 This
appears to be a logical conclusion because as a manufacturer, there is a
need to sell the product to a distributer, which implies the manufacturer has
the necessary knowledge of how to sell the product.92 Based on this analysis, there is enough of a connection to infer knowledge from manufacturing
to distributing.93 If a prior manufacturing conviction is enough to infer
knowledge for distribution, can a prior conviction for possession allow such
an inference of knowledge for a separate conviction for intent to distribute?94 It would appear from the previous analysis that with mere possession,
a defendant only has knowledge on how to buy the drug, not how to sell
it.95 Further, a prior possession conviction is unlike prior manufacturing
convictions, where knowledge of distribution is reasonably inferable as it is
within the nature of the crime.96 Nevertheless, the answer to this question is
disputed, as exemplified by a circuit split.97

2.

Intent

When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the defendant’s intent is
at issue.98 However, if the defendant denies that the charged act even occurred, intent is not at issue.99 The use of intent as a purpose under Rule
404(b)(2) is to show that based on the defendant’s prior acts he actually
intended to commit the alleged crime.100 The purpose of intent draws a fine
line and can often lead to the conclusion that the defendant was acting in
conformity with his character, which Rule 404(b)(1) strictly prohibits.101
Prior act evidence for the purpose of intent is sometimes in the form of
convictions, but usually it is in the form of uncharged acts that have built up
to the particular charge at hand.102 With uncharged prior acts, the judge
must find that (1) the prosecution met their burden of proof by a preponder91.
See id.
92.
See United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 1001 (9th Cir. 1998).
93.
See id.
94.
See id.
95.
See id.
96.
See id.
97.
See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 2013).
98.
PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 404 (3d ed.) (citing United
States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 1997)), available at www.westlaw.com (search
“Fed. Rules of Evidence 404 (3d ed.)”; scroll to Practice Comment (II)(A)(iv)).
99.
See id. (citing United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660 (8th Cir. 1997)).
100.
See id.
101.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1) (West 2015).
102.
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 98 (citing United States v. Elkins, 732 F.2d 1280,
1286 (6th Cir. 1984)); scroll to Practice & Comment II.B.iii.
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ance of the evidence that the prior act occurred and (2) the defendant was
the actor.103 As an example, in order to prove intent, an informant testified
that on ten different occasions he had purchased cocaine from the defendant.104 This evidence was proper to demonstrate the defendant’s intent—as
intent to distribute is not any clearer than by ten different transactions to the
same person.105 When a prior conviction is used that did not build up to the
crime at issue, the purpose of intent becomes more complicated and less
clear.106
The element of intent is essential to drug charges and often is in dispute.107 If the judge allows a prior conviction to prove intent, the majority
of the prosecution’s work is completed and a new conviction is often the
result.108 A court found that a prior conviction for cocaine trafficking was
proper for the purpose of intent for a separate charge of cocaine possession,
even when the defendant claimed that he lacked constructive possession.109
Situations like this often raise constitutional questions regarding double
jeopardy, which have generally been unsuccessful.110 Based on this outcome, it shows that the use of a prior conviction involving commercial drug
activity is relevant for intent to establish a separate instance of simple possession.111
Some courts have been willing to extend this application in reverse:
applying simple possession convictions to show intent for crimes involving
commercial drug activity.112 Yet, how can a prior conviction for mere possession show intent in a separate instance of possession with intent to distribute?113 This conclusion means that just because someone possessed a
drug at one point in time he/she now has the future intent to sell.114

103.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 4:29.
104.
Id.
105.
See id.
106.
See id.
107.
See ROBERT E. LARSEN, NAVIGATING THE FEDERAL TRIAL § 10:47 (2014).
108.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 4:29.
109.
See United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2006).
110.
See generally United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1992) (admitting
prior conviction evidence that has already been used to prove the defendant’s intent for a
separate conviction does not prompt the Double Jeopardy Clause contained within the Fifth
Amendment).
111.
See Paulino, 445 F.3d at 221.
112.
See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2013).
113.
See id.
114.
See id.
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Absence of Mistake or Accident/ Doctrine of Chances

Absence of mistake or accident is another way for the prosecution to
enter prior acts into evidence in the absence of knowledge or intent under
Rule 404(b)(2).115 Courts often refer to this purpose as the Doctrine of
Chances, which stands for the notion: the more an unusual or highly unlikely event occurs, the more likely subsequent events of the same nature are
not an accident or mistake.116 If the defendant denies the alleged crime even
occurred, the evidence offered to show absence of mistake is inadmissible.117 The specific use of the Doctrine of Chances rarely provides an opportunity for the defendant to claim the event did not even occur, especially
because the event usually involves murder or insurance fraud.118 Despite the
unlikelihood component of the Doctrine of Chances, prosecutors have offered prior possession convictions in order to show absence of mistake for a
separate charge of possession with intent to sell.119
B.

STEP TWO: RELEVANT UNDER RULE 402 AS ENFORCED
UNDER RULE 104(B)

After prior act evidence is offered for a proper purpose under Rule
404(b), the judge then needs to decide if the prior act is relevant under Rule
402.120 Rule 402 states, “Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant
evidence is not admissible.”121 Rule 402 implies the relevance standard in
Rule 401, which states, “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;
and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”122 Rule 402 is
an informal presumption, meaning as long as the evidence is admissible
under Rule 401 and not excluded from any sources listed in Rule 402, it is
admissible.123 It is important to note that Rule 402 affects evidence rules

115.
LARSEN, supra note 107, § 10:52.
116.
Id.
117.
See United States v. Nichols, 808 F.2d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 1987).
118.
LARSEN, supra note 107, § 10:52.
119.
See generally United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432 (2008) (holding that the lower
courts erred in admitting prior convictions to prove absence of mistake or accident because
the defendant did not assert a defense based on absence or mistake).
120.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
121.
FED. R. EVID. 402 (West 2015).
122.
FED. R. EVID. 401 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
123.
See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE RULE 402 (3d ed. 2013).
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both retrospectively and prospectively.124 For instance, the creation of a
constitutional rule or a new evidentiary rule immediately takes precedent
over the Federal Rules of Evidence.125 In addition, any rule changes made
by the Supreme Court also take precedent over the Federal Rules.126 This
step of the analysis also requires Rule 402 be enforced through Rule 104(b),
which states, “When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact
exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact
does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition
that the proof be introduced later.”127
C.

STEP THREE: THE BALANCING TEST

This balancing step of the analysis is perhaps the most important as it
examines the potential burden of unfair prejudice placed on the defendant.128 Rule 403 states, “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”129 All
of the potential dangers listed in Rule 403, collectively referred to as “unfair prejudice,” means guilt will be determined “on a ground different from
proof specific to the offense charged.”130 The logic behind this rule is, when
the jury is uncertain of guilt, even if a prior act or conviction is relevant to
the alleged crime, they will probably convict the defendant because he deserves punishment.131 The other possible danger is the jury can issue a
guilty verdict as a “preventative conviction”—meaning even though the
defendant is innocent today, he is likely to be guilty in the future because he
has been guilty previously.132 Further, the probative value of the evidence
has to outweigh “ordinary relevance.”133 The trial judge makes this determination based on a balancing test: whether the evidence is more probative
than prejudicial.134 In this determination, the judge should consider the ju-

124.
See KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR. & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 22A FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 5199 (2d ed. 2014).
125.
See id.
126.
Id.
127.
FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (West 2015).
128.
See FED. R. EVID. 403 (West 2015).
129.
Id.
130.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (discussing FED. R. EVID.
403).
131.
Id. at 181 (citing United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)).
132.
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181.
133.
See id.
134.
Id. (citing United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 432 (2d Cir. 1978)).
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ry’s likely hostile reaction to prior conviction evidence.135 For these reasons, arguments for or against the evidence should take place without the
presence of the jury.136
The United States Supreme Court addressed this balancing test in
depth in Old Chief v. United States when a defendant faced charges of felonious possession of a firearm and the prosecution requested to enter the
details of the defendant’s prior felony conviction to prove he was, in fact, a
felon, and thus, the statute was applicable.137 In Old Chief, the defendant
had a prior conviction for assault with a firearm with the alleged crimes
being assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.138 The defendant requested a limiting jury instruction, which
would inform the jury that the defendant previously committed a felony
punishable by imprisonment for at least one year.139 The defendant argued
the previous assault charges would add too much weight of unfair prejudice
to the current assault charge against him.140 The lower courts decided the
prosecution did not have to agree to the stipulation and allowed the jury to
hear detailed evidence of the defendant’s prior felony conviction.141 The
defendant appealed and argued that the unfair prejudice from the prior felony conviction substantially outweighed the probative value, and the Court
agreed.142
The prosecution’s most convincing argument for rejecting the defendant’s stipulation is the prosecution is entitled to prove the case with their
choice of evidence, and a criminal defendant cannot stipulate his way out of
specific details.143 Allowing the prosecution to present such evidence “tells
a colorful story with descriptive richness” and fulfills a juror’s expectations.144 The Court agreed that interrupted gaps in a story could cause confusion and be detrimental to the prosecution’s case.145 However, the issue in
Old Chief was with the defendant’s legal status, which the Court concluded
did not interrupt the prosecution’s story to the jury.146
For instance, all the jury needed to know to convict the defendant of
possession of a firearm by a felon was that he was, in fact, a felon.147 The
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180.
See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 37, § 4:29 (discussing Rule 104(c)).
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 175.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 185.
See id. at 176-78.
See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 187.
Id. at 189.
See id. at 191.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191 (1997).
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details of the defendant’s felony conviction were immaterial because for the
crime charged, the Court further explained that it did not matter whether the
felony charge was for possessing short lobsters or for aggravated murder.148
This analysis balanced the government’s interest in proving the elements of
a crime with the defendant’s interest in avoiding unfair prejudice, which the
Court concluded the lower court abused its discretion in admitting such
evidence.149 Perhaps the most compelling argument to exclude prior possession convictions in new instances of possession with intent to distribute is
that the evidence’s probative value can never outweigh the risk of unfair
prejudice, similar to the legal status issue in Old Chief.150
D.

STEP FOUR: THE LIMITING JURY INSTRUCTION

The last step of the Huddleston test suggests that the defense request a
limiting jury instruction to ensure the jury uses the prior conviction for a
proper purpose.151 However, there are arguments that suggest the jury has a
difficulty keeping the instruction separate from the rest of the case, which
results in unfair prejudice.152 Whether a jury instruction about a prior possession conviction can effectively fulfill its purpose and outweigh unfair
prejudice extends beyond the scope of this Comment.153

IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE MODERN TREND
In order to provide a uniform approach, it is important to understand
the different tests each circuit has applied when faced with the issue of evidence of a prior conviction for possession to prove a separate instance of
possession with intent to sell.154 In the 1990s, courts faced first impressions
with this issue and allowed prior possession evidence in cases involving
commercial drug charges; however, there is a recent trend to exclude this
evidence.155 Cases after Huddleston have applied their own form of the
Huddleston test with their own supplements and the reasoning has transformed significantly.156 Characterized as harmless error, early cases often
used prior possession convictions to prove a new and separate instance of
148.
Id. (citing United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994)).
149.
See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 173.
150.
See id.
151.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
152.
See United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding
that the limiting instruction did not “cure the error” and that the admission of the prior possession conviction was more unfairly prejudicial than probative).
153.
See id.
154.
See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 2013).
155.
See id.
156.
See id.
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intent to sell.157 More recently, courts have found the error to be harmful
and question the relevance of such evidence and whether the evidence
could ever outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice.158
The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits continuously characterized
prior conviction evidence as harmless error because of the usual amount of
evidence already against the defendant and the practice continues today.159
However, in the past ten years, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have undergone a more modern approach, reversing convictions due
to abuse of discretion.160 This modern approach is possibly a backlash effect from the “War on Drugs” initiative.161 For example, prosecutors were
issuing charges with greater mandatory sentences, such as intent to distribute rather than mere possession, for the purpose of keeping drugs off the
streets longer.162 However, this backlash from the “War on Drugs” has dissipated, and courts are more willing to recognize the risks associated with
prior possession convictions used as evidence in new cases for intent to
sell.163 The difference between the circuits further demonstrates the need for
a uniform approach for courts when faced with prior possession convictions
used as evidence for a new charge involving commercial drug activity.164

V.

NEED FOR A UNIFORM APPROACH

Alternative approaches should revolve around the concept that simple
possession convictions are entirely different from commercial drug activities. As stated in United States v. Ono, “Acts related to the personal use of a
controlled substance are of a wholly different order than acts involving the
distribution of a controlled substance. One activity involves the personal
abuse of narcotics, the other the implementation of a commercial activity
for profit.”165 Therefore, the use of prior possession convictions as evidence
under 404(b)(2) for a new commercial drug charge should require strict
criticism to ensure that the prior conviction has more probative than unfairly prejudicial value.166
157.
See United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1989).
158.
See Davis, 726 F.3d at 445.
159.
See id.
160.
See id.; United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002) (clarifying
that the standard of review for all evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion).
161.
See generally The Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton &
John R. Steer, Competing Sentencing Policies in A “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 305 (1993).
162.
See id.
163.
See id.
164.
See Davis, 726 F.3d at 445.
165.
United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990).
166.
See id.

2015]

EVERY CONSUMER KNOWS HOW TO RUN A BUSINESS

417

For example, the Third Circuit most recently addressed this issue in
United States v. Davis and decided mere possession convictions and commercial drug crimes are not similar, which makes the prior possession conviction irrelevant, with lower probative value.167 In Davis, the defendant
was charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.168 At
trial, the defendant denied having knowledge and intent; therefore, the
prosecution was allowed to introduce two prior convictions for possession
of cocaine to demonstrate the defendant’s intent and/or knowledge under
Rule 404(b)(2).169 The prosecution offered to admit this evidence with the
specific purpose to prove that the defendant had the knowledge and/or intent by showing the defendant knew what cocaine was and how to sell
drugs.170 The Davis court applied the Huddleston test and deemed the admission of the defendant’s prior convictions to be erroneous.171 In reaching
its conclusion, the court explained that it could not find a reasonable connection as to why these two prior convictions would prove anything other
than character and the prior convictions should have been excluded under
part three of the Huddleston test.172
The court also sharply criticized the lower court for suggesting that a
person previously convicted of possession has the same knowledge as a
drug dealer.173 Just because a person has possessed a substance, does not
indicate this individual would recognize the same substance when it is prepared and packaged in greater quantities.174 Quality of the substance like
cocaine is also a complicated issue, as different purities result in different
forms, such as powder or rocks.175 In addition, the jury did not know the
facts of the prior convictions in terms of quantity or quality to make the
decision if the prior conviction would contribute to the defendant’s
knowledge.176 Even if quantity and quality were not at issue, the act of mere
possession and the act of possession with intent to distribute are distinguishable because there is not a logical nexus between the knowledge one
167.
See Davis, 726 F.3d at 442.
168.
Id. at 438.
169.
Id. The prosecution was allowed to offer multiple purposes for the purpose of
the prior convictions. See id.
170.
See id. at 443-44.
171.
See id. at 441.
172.
United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013) (requiring that the
evidence be more helpful than prejudicial). See FED. R. EVID. 403 (West 2015).
173.
Davis, 726 F.3d at 443.
174.
Id.
175.
Id.
176.
Id. It could also be argued that the jury should know details of the prior possession conviction to make their own determination as to whether it would have given the defendant knowledge or the intent necessary for a charge involving commercial drug activity.
See id.
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may have from possessing cocaine and the knowledge one has in order to
sell cocaine.177 It would be simply unreasonable to suggest that just because
a person has the knowledge as a consumer, they would have the necessary
knowledge for activities in a commercial context.178
In addition, the Davis court found use of the prior possession convictions for intent under Rule 404(b) to be an error by the trial court.179 This
was an error because (1) the act of possession and possession with intent to
sell are two entirely different acts and (2) just because a person possessed
cocaine in the past, does not indicate the person has the intent to sell cocaine in the future.180 The court was able to easily recognize that this evidence was character evidence in disguise, which is the exact inference Rule
404 prohibits.181 Based on this analysis and the risk posed that the jury
might give prior act evidence too much weight, it appears that the Third
Circuit would never allow a possession conviction into evidence to infer
knowledge and/or intent for a separate instance of possession with intent to
sell.182 This opinion by the Third Circuit suggests the prior possession conviction was irrelevant: Consequently, should Rule 404(b)(2) require a higher standard of relevancy than “any tendency” under Rule 401?183 Even
though the court ultimately reversed this conviction under the balancing test
required under Rule 403, the court’s opinion suggests that the prior conviction was irrelevant as a preliminary matter.184
A.

SHOULD 404(B)(2) REQUIRE MORE THAN “ANY TENDENCY?”

The inconsistent application of Rule 404(b)(2) among the circuits requires a framework set in place by the United States Supreme Court, that
states Rule 404(b) evidence requires a higher relevancy standard than contained in Rule 401.185 Before reaching the Huddleston test, the first step for
all evidence to pass is through Rule 401, which states evidence is relevant if
it has “any tendency” to make a material fact more or less probable.186 The

177.
United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2013).
178.
See id.
179.
Id. at 444.
180.
Id.
181.
See id. at 442 (citing United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir.
1992)).
182.
See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 442 (3d Cir. 2013).
183.
See id.
184.
See id.
185.
See id. It is important that the solution comes from the United States Supreme
Court to ensure a proper application by all jurisdictions.
186.
See FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (West 2015); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 691 (1988).
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“any tendency” threshold is very low and easily met.187 This framework
would use Rule 401 as a base, would set forth factors when Rule 404(b)(2)
evidence is presented, and require a higher standard of relevancy.188
Specific guidelines within this approach would establish a higher
standard of relevancy.189 For example, in order for a prior conviction to be
relevant, it must be significantly similar to the new charge or proximate in
time.190 These guidelines would direct the trier of fact in deciding whether a
prior conviction is relevant to the charged crime.191 With the current state of
Rule 401, courts would most likely find a prior conviction relevant.192 If
these common law guidelines existed, it would provide an extra barrier to
eliminate confusion and currently existing unfair prejudice within the circuits concerning prior possession convictions when offered for a Rule
404(b)(2) purpose in commercial drug charges.193
For example, the Ninth Circuit has applied its own common law test
when it uses Rule 401 to determine if a prior possession conviction is relevant to a new charge of possession with intent to distribute.194 In United
States v. Santini, the defendant claimed he lacked knowledge of marijuana
hidden in his car when he was at a border control stop coming into the
United States from Mexico.195 The defendant’s defense relied heavily on a
traumatic brain injury he experienced five years prior, and argued this injury made it easy for others to manipulate or trick him.196 The defense’s expert witness, a clinical psychologist, testified the defendant had permanent
cognitive deficiencies and this “type of injury can cause difficulty with ‘social perception of other people.’”197 In contrast, the prosecution’s expert
witness was a psychiatrist who testified his evaluation did not indicate the
defendant was more susceptible to manipulation than the average person.198
However, the prosecution’s expert witness made this determination based
on the defendant’s “rap sheet,” which indicated numerous confrontations
with the law.199 This expert witness claimed that if the defendant’s injury
187.
See FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (West 2015).
188.
See id.
189.
See id.
190.
See id.
191.
See id.
192.
See FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (West 2015). This evidence might pass the relevancy
standard of Rule 401, but may be barred later by a Rule 403 objection. See FED. R. EVID. 403
(West 2015).
193.
See FED. R. EVID. 401(a) (West 2015).
194.
See United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011).
195.
Id. at 1077.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011).
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influenced the present charge, then he expected the defendant would not
have any similar conduct on his “rap sheet” before the brain injury.200
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the testimony discussing the “rap sheet”
and applied a four-part test which stated, “Such evidence may be admitted
if: (1) the evidence tends to prove a material point; (2) the other act is not
too remote in time; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that
defendant committed the other act; and (4) (in certain cases) the act is similar to the offense charged.”201 A common law interpretation of Rule 401,
similar to the one applied here by the Ninth Circuit, would provide a strict
guideline for the courts, which would assist in the application of
404(b)(2).202
In Santini, the defendant’s criminal history was inadmissible because
it failed the third and fourth prong of this test.203 The third prong failed because the expert witness admitted on cross-examination that the information
was hard to understand and the defense argued there were multiple allegations from the same incident from different contacts.204 The court also recognized the trial court never even examined the “rap sheet” and it was not
on the record.205 Therefore, the testimony stating that the defendant had a
history of extensive contact with law enforcement should have made the
testimony itself inadmissible.206 Additionally, the testimony was inadmissible under the fourth prong of this test because the acts on the “rap sheet”
were not similar enough to the alleged crime.207 The “rap sheet” contained
information concerning a prior conviction for “simple” possession and arrests for indecent exposure and assault.208 The court concluded the “rap

200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 1077-78 (using the test derived from United States v. Romero, 282 F.3d
683, 688 (9th Cir. 2002)).
202.
See id.
203.
Id. at 1078.
204.
United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2011). The government
also argued that the testimony regarding the defendant’s criminal history should be admitted
under Rule 703, which explains that the facts or data that the expert opinion uses to formulate their opinion does not have to be admissible for the opinion itself to be admitted. However, the court rejected this argument because the expert’s opinion was not based upon sufficient facts or data (required under Rule 703) and the testimony was far more prejudicial than
probative Rule 403. Id. at 1078-79.
205.
Id. at 1078.
206.
See id.
207.
Id. The court indicated that the prior possession conviction was “simple,” further demonstrating how courts are refusing to find a logical connection between possession
and crimes involving drug distribution. See United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1078
(9th Cir. 2011).
208.
Id.
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sheet” consisted of acts that were not similar to the importation of marijuana, and as a result, the evidence lacked probative value.209
Based on the expert’s testimony that the defendant engaged in similar
confrontations with the law before his brain injury, a juror would conclude
the defendant had imported drugs before his brain injury.210 However, the
defendant only had a prior conviction for “simple” possession, he did not
have a criminal history relating to drug distribution or any commercial drug
activity.211 The court also concluded that even though there was a limiting
instruction that advised the jury not to consider the testimony about the
confrontations with law enforcement, the jury instruction involved evaluating the expert’s testimony that stated the brain injury did not contribute to
the defendant’s conduct.212 As a result, the limiting instruction did not “cure
the error” and it was more probable than not that the trial court’s error materially affected the verdict.213 The analysis from the Ninth Circuit is
demonstrative of the modern trend’s prohibition against the use of prior
possession convictions in new charges for drug crimes within a commercial
context simply because it is found to be irrelevant.214 Not only would a new
framework contribute to the proper application of 404(b)(2), but also its
ultimate purpose to shield the defendant from a guilty verdict solely because he has previously committed a “simple” drug crime.
This approach would prevent the outcome that occurred in United
States v. Butler, where the Eleventh Circuit found that personal drug use
was relevant to a drug crime in a commercial context.215 In Butler, the trial
court permitted the prosecution to enter into evidence the defendant’s prior
conviction for possession of cocaine, which occurred nearly a decade earlier, to prove intent for a commercial drug crime.216 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit, for the first time, addressed the issue of using prior personal drug
use convictions in a commercial setting.217 However, the court has allowed
evidence of possession convictions in past cases concerning personal drug

209.
See id. The common law supplement properly prohibited the prior possession
conviction because it was not similar enough to commercial drug activity. See id.
210.
See id. at 1079.
211.
United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011).
212.
See id.
213.
Id.
214.
See id. When the lower court admitted the prior simple possession conviction
for the new charge of importation of marijuana, the error was considered harmful. Id. “An
error is harmless if ‘it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the
verdict.’” United States v. Liera, 585 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002)).
215.
United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195 (11th Cir. 1997).
216.
Id.
217.
Id.
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use during a conspiracy,218 and to show trust between two people during a
conspiracy.219 Disregarding whether a prior conviction intimately relates to
the charged conspiracy, the Eleventh Circuit decided to extend this particular use of prior convictions.220
The Eleventh Circuit applied a three-part test adopted from the Fifth
Circuit, to determine if admitting the prior conviction was an error.221 The
test requires (1) the evidence have another purpose other than character, (2)
is sufficient to conclude the defendant committed the act, and (3) the probative value must outweigh unfair prejudice.222 The court relied on the Fifth
Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 404(b)(2) concerning prior convictions and
stated it is logical to admit evidence of prior personal drug use to prove
intent in a subsequent case for drug distribution charges.223 Without further
explanation, the court simply states with specific intent crimes, such as drug
crimes, intent is at issue and prior personal drug use is relevant.224 Lastly,
the court concluded that even if there was an error, it was harmless and was
highly unlikely to have influenced the outcome of the verdict due to the
amount of evidence against the defendant and any error in admitting the
prior conviction would not present grounds for a conviction reversal.225
This new interpretation of Rule 401, in relation to Rule 404(b)(2), would
have first analyzed whether the acts were similar enough to be relevant.
Based on the outcomes of recent decisions, an outcome similar to the one in
Butler is unlikely because personal drug use is now considered distant from
drug acts involved in a commercial setting; therefore, prior possession convictions would be irrelevant.226
A new framework for Rule 401 when dealing with Rule 404(b) might
not resolve this issue entirely, especially if there is already a large amount
of evidence against the defendant.227 For example, in United States v.
Monzon, the Seventh Circuit applied a common law rule that (1) the prior
conviction cannot relate to general character evidence, (2) the past and current acts must be similar and proximate in time, and (3) the prior act or
218.
See id. (citing United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir.
1992)).
219.
See Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195 (deciding that a relationship between a drug dealer
and a purchaser for personal use is enough to establish a relationship for a conspiracy) (citing United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 869 (11th Cir. 1984)).
220.
See Butler, 102 F.3d at 1195.
221.
Id.
222.
See id. (citing United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992)).
223.
Butler, 102 F.3d 1196.
224.
See id.
225.
See id.
226.
See United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990)).
227.
See United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1989).
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conviction must be more probative than prejudicial.228 In Monzon, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute, and intentional distribution of cocaine.229
The defendant was involved in a twenty thousand dollar cocaine transaction
with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), in which his co-conspirators
took a plea deal and testified against him at trial.230
At trial, the arresting police officer revealed during his testimony that
he found marijuana butts in the defendant’s car subsequent to arrest.231 In
addition, another officer testified that he observed the defendant with a long
pinky fingernail on different occasions—once after the defendant was arrested and once eight months before the arrest, which the officer suggested,
“was a fad among cocaine users and traffickers.”232 The prosecution attempted to avoid Rule 404(b) in order to include this testimony and argued
neither of the testimonies were for the purpose of character evidence.233
Instead, the prosecution argued that both testimonies were evidence of the
same transaction or event—the current alleged crime.234 The court rejected
this argument and stated that neither testimony intricately related to the
alleged crime because the testimonies lacked a close relationship to the
defendant’s motive or intent, and the acts were not separate uncharged acts
undertaken as part of the same transaction.235
The court found that the testimonial evidence did not relate to general
character evidence because the marijuana butts and long pinky fingernail
were proper for proving the defendant’s intent.236 However, the court concluded that the evidence failed under the similar act and close proximity
requirement, because it lacked probative value—as the only probative
worth was towards the defendant’s character to show he was more likely
than not to have committed the crimes.237 Even though it was clear error to
admit this evidence because it was only valuable for inadmissible character
evidence, the court found the error to be harmless because of the other
overwhelming amount of testimony against the defendant.238 Even though

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
1987)).
236.
237.
238.
amount of

See id.
See id. at 340.
Id. at 340-41.
Id. at 343.
United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 343-44 (citing United States v. Hawkins, 828 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir.
Id. at 343.
See United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344-45 (7th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 335. An evidentiary error is harmless when there is an overwhelming
evidence against the defendant and the error was so minimal that it did not influ-
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the Monzon court did not reverse the conviction due to an overwhelming
amount of evidence, the court acknowledged the lack of similarity between
personal drug use and commercial drug activity.239 However, it is possible
that the Seventh Circuit’s common law rule could have resulted in a reversal of Monzon’s conviction if there had not been such overwhelming evidence already against him.240
B.

A PRIOR POSSESSION CONVICTION CAN RARELY
OUTWEIGH THE RISK OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE: THE
INFERENTIAL LEAP THAT IS TOO GREAT

An alternative and more straightforward approach would be to use the
structure already in place and clarify that prior possession convictions in
new instances of commercial drug activity charges are impermissible because the risk of unfair prejudice greatly outweighs its probative value.241
This approach would continue to use the framework set forth in Huddleston, but requires clarification from the United States Supreme Court stating that prior possession convictions used for purposes under Rule
404(b)(2) can rarely outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice, becoming a majority rather than a minority admission standard.242
For example, as the Sixth Circuit rationalized, the accuracy of the balancing requirement is the most crucial step from Huddleston:
When jurors hear that a defendant has on earlier
occasions committed essentially the same crime as
that for which he is on trial, the information unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial impact. That, of course, is why the prosecution uses
such evidence whenever it can. When prior acts evidence is introduced, regardless of the stated purpose, the likelihood is very great that the jurors will
use the evidence precisely for the purpose it may
not be considered; to suggest that the defendant is a
bad person, a convicted criminal, and that if he
“did it before he probably did it again.” That is
why the trial court’s duty is to apply Rule 404(b)
ence the jury’s decision. Id. (citing United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir.
1988)).
239.
See Monzon, 869 F.2d at 335.
240.
See id.
241.
See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
242.
See id. The only relevant clarification of Rule 404(b) from the United States
Supreme Court was from Huddleston, this specific issue has yet to be heard.
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correctly and, before admitting such evidence, to
decide carefully whether it will be more substantially prejudicial than probative.243
In most instances, evidence of a prior possession conviction is unnecessarily cumulative because there is usually a large amount of evidence
already against the defendant.244 Therefore, the probative value of a prior
conviction is slight while the unfair prejudice to the defendant is significant.245 Additionally, the probative value that a prior possession conviction
has towards a commercial drug charge is insignificant because the prior
conviction only stands for the fact the defendant has possessed the drug
before and perhaps knows how to purchase it.246 The knowledge of what a
drug looks like and how to purchase it is a far stretch from knowing how to
sell, manufacture, or transport drugs in large quantities.247
Conversely, a prior manufacturing conviction used for a Rule
404(b)(2) purpose for a charge for possession with intent to distribute is
logical,248 and the inferential leap is minimal.249 A prior manufacturing
conviction reveals that the defendant knows what the drug looks like, is
familiar with the drug, knows how to sell the drug, and likely is part of a
drug network.250 The inference that the defendant knows how to sell the
drug is simple: the manufacturer has to sell to a dealer or distributer; therefore making the inferential leap is slight.251 When viewed in this light, it is
easy to see that the inferential leap between a mere possession conviction
and any commercial drug activity is too tenuous to be supported by the pol-

243.
See United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United
States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994)).
244.
See Bell, 516 F.3d 432. Therefore, on review, the use of the prior act evidence is
usually characterized as harmless error. See id.
245.
See id. at 446.
246.
See United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1034-35 (5th Cir. 1992). Whether
the prior conviction indicates the defendant knows how to buy drugs depends upon the circumstances. For example, if the defendant purchased drugs from a government informant, it
is reasonable to infer that the defendant has the knowledge of how to buy drugs. Without
evidence of the actual transaction and just being caught with possession, the knowledge of
how to buy drugs may lead to controversy because the drugs could have been given to the
defendant. This means that a prior act of possession or prior possession conviction only
reveals knowledge in the slightest form: the defendant knows what the drug looks like. See
id.
247.
See id.
248.
See United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1998).
249.
Id. at 1001.
250.
See id.
251.
See id.
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icies underlying the 404(b)(2) exceptions, and does not withstand careful
reasoning.252
After recognizing that a logical nexus does not exist between a former
conviction for mere possession and a current charge for commercial drug
activity, it is clear that prosecutors use Rule 404(b)(2) to admit cumulative
evidence, which would ordinarily be barred by Rule 403, to “seal the deal”
when there is already an ample amount of evidence against the defendant.253
Another reason this evidence is admitted is to have the jury infer that because a defendant previously possessed a drug, he probably committed this
drug crime too, which in either of these situations still results in general
propensity logic, which Rule 403 was created to guard against.254

VI. CONCLUSION
In order for courts to properly apply Rule 404(b)(2) in commercial
drug activity cases when prior possession convictions are offered as evidence, there needs to be a supplement to the general relevancy standard or
clarification by the United States Supreme Court.255 This clarification
should conclude that instances of prior possession or prior possession convictions are entirely different from commercial drug activity.256 When these
prior acts or convictions are used to help prove new instances of commercial drug activity, the heart of the argument is that, because a person previously possessed a drug, that person now has the intent or knowledge to
commit a commercial drug crime.257 This conclusion simply does not survive logical scrutiny.258 Therefore, prior possession convictions used for
commercial drug charges under Rule 404(b)(2) create an unacceptable risk
of unfair prejudice against the defendant, which typically results in a conviction.259
As soon as the jury hears that the defendant has previously committed
a drug crime of any kind, they are more likely to convict him.260 Even
though there is a limiting jury instruction, the jury is still comprised of hu-

252.
See id.
253.
See United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 446 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the
amount of deference given to trial court’s discretion and that the amount of evidence against
the defendant might persuade the judge to admit the evidence because it is likely that the
defendant will be convicted regardless).
254.
See id.; FED. R. EVID. 403 (West 2015).
255.
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (West 2015).
256.
See United States v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990).
257.
See id.
258.
See id.
259.
See id.
260.
See Hofmeyer, supra note 23.
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mans.261 It is difficult to use such information for one limited purpose and
avoid using it for another when there are gaps and lack of clarity in the
law.262 Therefore, prior possession convictions should have limited use in
rare circumstances.263 These rare circumstances would include instances
where the prior conviction use is obviously relevant.264 For example, if the
defendant claims he has never seen marijuana before but has a ten-year-old
prior marijuana conviction.265 This is an example of evidence that supports
a fact that does not include speculation: the defendant has seen marijuana
before because he previously possessed it.266
In contrast, the use of a prior possession conviction to show
knowledge or intent for a commercial drug crime requires an inferential
leap that is simply too great and results in unjust results.267 For example,
inferring that the defendant has the knowledge or intent to manufacture or
sell drugs simply because he previously possessed drugs.268 The use of prior
act or conviction evidence in this instance is general propensity logic in
disguise.269 Therefore, the use of prior act or possession convictions should
be strictly limited to instances where the relevance of the acts or convictions is readily apparent, and its use should be removed from common practice.270 This reinforces the idea that the defendant is found guilty because he
committed the alleged crime,271 not that he was found guilty because his
prior possession meant that he would have been more likely to have committed commercial drug activity or because his prior possession conviction
made him generally a bad person.272 Thus, the Huddleston test should remain applicable, but the analysis should end with the balancing step requirement because the prior possession convictions have little value for
commercial drug charges, while the prejudicial impact is immeasurable.273
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